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Abstract  
Thai foreign policy in the 1990s has been said to be contingent on the government in 
power, which changes between (or within) these groups and vacillates between pro-democratic 
reformists/principle-pursuers and the conservatives/profit-seekers. In these studies, Thailand’s 
Indochinese policy has often been referred to as a typical consequence of politics between the 
pragmatists and the reformists. However, whether or not domestic oppositional politics is the key 
determinant of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era still requires further examination, 
precisely because the model is now facing serious challenges between theory and reality.  
In this paper, I review the existing arguments concerning Thailand’s foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War Era and point out their limitations and questions for future study. 
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Introduction 
This paper examines prevailing assumptions about the influence of domestic politics over 
democratization on Thailand’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.  
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, one of the leading scholars of Thai foreign policy and a former 
diplomat, boldly admitted in his recent book that Thailand’s foreign policy has been little studied 
(Pavin 2010, xiii)
1
.  In fact, the number of papers on this topic, especially on post-Cold War foreign 
policy, is far from abundant.  Among those studies, some have depicted Thailand’s foreign policy 
as a consequence of international dynamics among the states and left its domestic policymaking 
process almost untouched. Others have focused on the domestic process and shown that Thailand’s 
policy in the post-Cold War era has been swayed by frequent government changes, which has made 
it difficult for most governments to formulate long-term strategic thinking.  
The domestic argument is divided between the different views of two groups on domestic 
politics in general and over democratization in particular.  One is the pro-democratic group or 
reformists that comprise urban white collar workers, international capitalists, the mass media and 
NGOs, who have supported liberal principles such as democracy and human rights in both Thailand 
and international society. The other group is the conservatives or pragmatists that are composed of 
politicians and local businessmen who have attached greater importance to their own economic 
profits and have been ignorant about (or even ignored) public interests (Anek 1992, Surin and 
MacCargo 1997). Thai foreign policy in the 1990s has been said to be contingent on the government 
in power, which changes between (or within) these groups and vacillates between 
reformists/principle-pursuers and pragmatists/profit-seekers (Kusuma 2001, Pavin 2005).  In these 
studies, Thailand’s Indochinese policy has often been referred to as a typical consequence of politics 
between the pragmatists and the reformists. Initiatives such as Chartichai Choonhavan’s “making 
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 All the citations of Thai literatures in this paper are referred by the author’s first name, following the 
academic practice regarding Thai area studies.   
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Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace” policy in the late 1980s, the pro-Myanmar policy by 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh in the middle of the ‘90s, and regional cooperation by Thaksin Sinnawatra in 
the early 2000s have been regarded as profit-seeking by politicians and political businessmen, and 
often criticized by media and intellectuals as the privatization of diplomacy (Khien 2004).   
However, whether or not domestic oppositional politics is the key determinant of foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War era still requires further examination, precisely because the model is 
now facing serious challenges between theory and reality. In this paper, I review the existing 
arguments concerning Thailand’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War Era and point out their 
limitations and questions for future study. 
 
 
1. Bureaucratic Polity and Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era 
To understand the existing research on post-Cold War foreign policy in Thailand, it is 
important to understand the political power structure during Cold War period. There seems to be an 
agreement among the students of Thai politics that Thai foreign policy has long been autonomous 
from bureaucracy and the military. Importantly, their views were influenced by  the notion of 
bureaucratic polity. Bureaucratic polity was widely known to prevail in the Thai political system 
until the end of the 1980s.  Riggs introduced this idea in his study tracing the change in government 
membership from 1932 to 1958. After finding that more than 80 percent of the total 237 cabinet 
members in that period were from the military or bureaucracy, Riggs concluded that the Thai state 
was highly independent from society and that the military and bureaucrats exclusively made 
decisions, and all the channels from the outside to the policymaking process were limited to the 
personal connection within those military and civilian cadres (Riggs 1966). Chai-anan developed 
this idea in his study of Thai politics from the 60s to the 70s and explained that there had been a 
political chance for an emergent bourgeois middle class to express their opinions, but most of the 
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important government posts and the legislative seats were dominated by top bureaucrats and military 
personnel (Chai-anan 1989). 
Regarding foreign policy, Fineman focused on the international background of the 
bureaucratic polity and pointed out the “special relationship” with the United States. Right after 
capturing power by a coup d’état at the end of the 1940s, Plaek Phibulsongkram (generally referred 
by his nickname “Pibul”) allied with the US and shifted Thailand’s government to an 
anti-communist party. Pibul expected to reinforce the Thai military as his power base with material 
and political support from the US (Fineman 1997). With the purpose of preventing the penetration of 
communism, the US supported suppression of the opponents of the Thai government.  The works 
by Darling also demonstrated the way two governments mutually developed interdependency facing 
the outbreak of armed conflicts in Laos and Vietnam in the 50s, which was followed by the 
escalation of the domestic communist insurgency in the 60s (Darling 1965).  
To sum up, bureaucratic polity was an autonomous system with closed recruitment, in which 
the bureaucrats and military could exclusively hold on to and exercise power under the name of 
national security against communism outside and within the territory with strong support from the 
US.  
Considering such a situation, Funston, Suchit and Kusuma concluded that the foreign policy 
under this system had been the realm of the professional diplomats and military, and that there was 
almost no room left for actors outside of the government (Funston 1987, 1998; Suchit 1990; Kusuma 
2001). More precisely, those studies depicted that foreign affairs had been exclusively managed by 
the National Security Council (NSC), which had been chaired by prime ministers with members 
such as professional diplomats, military professionals and experts. There the military could reflect 
their interests and opinions onto foreign policy through the prime ministers with military 
backgrounds.  On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) also played an unignorable 
role in this field. With the accumulated knowledge, network and art of diplomacy, MFA (especially a 
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few families that had produced many diplomats since the absolute monarchy era) exerted diplomatic 
leadership and sometimes out-did the prime ministers or the military. Funston mentioned the policies 
by Thanat Khoman, one of the founders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
one of the most famous Thai foreign minister from MFA, as a typical example of such MFA 
diplomacy in that period (Funston 1987). Their ultimate purpose was to protect Thai territorial 
integrity and national sovereignty from the menace of communism.  
 
 
2. Liberal Corporatism and Oppositional Politics in Foreign Policy 
The concept of the bureaucratic polity and its modifications were challenged later by Anek 
and Rangsan. They argued that the bureaucratic polity had gradually transformed into a more open, 
pluralistic system through the 1980s. Precisely, Rangsan examined the cabinet membership up to 
1988 in the same manner as Riggs did, and revealed an increasing share of businessmen (Rangsan 
1989).   Likewise, Anek focused on the non-parliamentary governmental institution and examined 
the relationship between actors of the state and society.  He stated that the non-state actors such as 
economic organizations played a significant role in the decision-making process there, and 
concluded that Thailand’s political system fit into Shmitter’s notion of liberal corporatism in which 
social actors voluntary participated in decision-making through institutions, not personal networks 
(Anek 1992). While Chai-anan stated that most of the businessmen who participated in the 
bureaucratic polity were “political businessmen” who used personal connections within the 
bureaucracy and military for their immediate and personal interests, Anek focused on the new type 
of businessmen who emerged in the economic boom in the early 1980s and stated that they joined 
politics in order to create better business conditions through direct involvement in policymaking 
(Anek 1992: 39-69).  
There is agreement among the scholars that the bureaucratic polity was imploded by the 
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political turmoil in the early 1990s. In 1991, the military coup d’états toppled Chartichai 
Choonhavan’s administration, whose popularly elected cabinet members had the largest support, and 
killed about a hundred of the protesters rallied against the coup in 1992. This incident known as 
“Black May” finally led to the constitutional amendment that prohibits non-elected military 
personnel from assuming the prime ministership.  Most literature regarded this as a watershed in 
Thai political de-militarization and democratization and defined those so-called “middle class” 
protesters as its main promoters. Thus, the politics through the 1990s have been depicted as 
oppositional politics “between the reformists and the conservatives” (Surin and MacCargo 1997, 
146). 
In this context, the “reformist” or pro-democratic group has allegedly been comprised of 
actors such as the internationally oriented capitalists, the urban white-collar workers, the mass media, 
technocrats and intellectuals (Surin and MacCargo [ibid.] or Anek 1993). Likewise, Kasian cites 
big-business executives, urban politicians, mainstream economists, state technocrats and human 
rights campaigners as part of the reformists (2006, 21). Their opponents have been assumed to be 
local businessmen and politicians representing rural areas (Surinand MacCargo 1997, 145), 
Thirayuth 1997, 150; Anek 2000, 4]), and alleged to be ignorant of national and macroeconomic 
matters, and instead interested in short-term personal or factional gains (Kasian 2006, 13). Tensions 
between the reformists and the conservatives have emerged over various policy issues, such as in the 
areas of deregulation and economic liberalization and foreign policy (Surin and MacCargo 1997, 
146). 
Thailand’s Indochinese policy has often been referred to as a typical consequence of politics 
between the reformists and the conservatives. It has been widely recognized that it was a group of 
businessmen and politicians that broke through the iron alliance of the military and MFA in the late 
1980s. The US withdrew the military presence from the region after the liberation of Saigon by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1975, and it was followed by declarations of open-economic 
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policies by the governments of Vietnam, Lao and Myanmar in the late 80s. The studies of Suchit and 
Buszynski concluded that the growing thaw in mainland Southeast Asia undermined the raison d’etre 
of the Cold War diplomatic regime (Suchit 1990, Buszynski 1994).   
Then On the other hand, with a shift toward democracy, the government led by popularly 
elected politicians was established in the general election in 1987.  The new Prime Minister 
Chartichai and his advisory group wrestled the power from the diplomat-military diplomatic alliance 
and initiated their new Indochina policy under their slogan, “making Indochina from a battlefield 
into a marketplace.” Suppakarn stated that behind Chartichai’s initiative, there was strong support 
from the rural business sectors through associations such as the provincial Thai Chamber of 
Commerce (TCC) (Suppakarn 2000, 168-169). Referring to Hewson and Anek, Suppakarn explained 
this policy change as a consequence of Thailand’s economic development after the 1960s. During 
that period, the Thai economy had shifted its focus from the export of primary commodities to 
manufacturing, and the emergent export-oriented business groups claimed their interests were to 
pursue the national interest (Suppakarn 2000, 168-169)
2
. She concluded that the foreign policy after 
Chartichai has been dominated mainly by politicians and businessmen although Chartichai was 
dislodged from power by a coup in 1991 (Suppakarn 2000, 2007).  
Kusuma adopted the political dichotomy of Surin and MacCargo and depicted Thai 
foreign policy in the 1990s as a struggle between two groups. One group pursued economic profit 
and assigned higher priority to trade and investment and concessions for natural resource 
development. The other group emphasized universal values such as human rights and democracy, 
and pursued public interests. She categorized initiatives by Chartichai, and Banharn Silpa-archa 
(1995-1996) and Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh (1996-1997) as profit-seeking, while the second 
government of Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001)’s policies against Myanmar’s human rights policy or 
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 However, she emphasized that the business sectors had been collaborators or lobbyists for the policy 
implementation, not direct policy-makers as Anek argued (Suppakarn 2000, 211).  
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against border narcotic trade was evaluated as a policy pursuing principles (Kusuma 2001). Kusuma 
admitted that Chuan had finally gave way to political pressures from ASEAN and for domestic 
demand for natural resources from Myanmar, but still she stressed in her paper that, “Thai foreign 
policy needed to have principles because it was a democratic society (2001, 208). 
Likewise, Pavin’s study of Thai-Myanmar relations resonated with this dichotomy of profit 
and principle. In his study, he displayed how the pragmatists sugar-coated their pursuit of private 
interests in Myanmar with the notion of “Thainess.” The profit-seekers maintained a close 
relationship with the Myanmar government under the name of Thainess. This concept has sometimes 
manifested as harmony and friendship between Buddhist nations in contrast to criticism against 
Myanmar by the Western nations, and sometimes as a regional power (Pavin 2005). I would like to 
stresses that the “profit” in Pavin’s study seems to be interpreted as “private interest,” in contrast to 
the Chuan government’s “moral conscious” or public-oriented attitude (Pavin 2005, 145).  
It is noteworthy that those studies also mention the manifesto of the Thai leaders, often on 
the side of profit-seekers, stating that Thailand’s intent was to be a regional leader. Providing some 
examples, both Funston and Kusuma mentioned Chaovalit’s initiative for the creation of 
“Suvannnaphumi” (literally meaning “golden land”) as a revived image of Thailand’s past hegemon 
in the region, but they did not provide enough interpretation on them (2001, 194; 1998, 269]). The 
backgrounds and the motives of the initiatives by those profit-seekers need to be considered from the 
reason I will explain later in this paper. 
In those studies of the opposition politics model, foreign policy by Thaksin has allegedly been 
defined as an ultimate case of profit-seeking. Right after he assumed the premiership, Thaksin 
restructured the system of foreign policymaking by appointing those who were close to him, and 
directly embarked on policies named “proactive foreign policy.” Thus Thaksin promoted 
regional cooperation with neighboring countries such as Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, together 
with economic integration via FTAs with economic powers like Japan, China and the US. His drastic 
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style was later criticized as “privatization of foreign policy.”  Khien Theeravit, for example, 
harshly criticized this “proactive foreign policy” stating that it ignored “genuine” 
regional/national interests.  
The government adheres to the capitalist principle that the interest of the 
country, the capitalists, and the people are identical. To promote the 
interest of the capitalists world-wide is a part of the government’s policy. 
But in these instances the beneficiary on the Thai side happens to be a 
company belonging to the Prime Minister’s family, Shin Corp, a 
transnational telecom enterprise. (Khien 2004) 
     In sum, the oppositional politics model has depicted Thailand’s foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War age as shown in Figure. 
 
 
Figure : Comparing the Frameworks Concerning Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era 
Year 1988-91 1991-92 1992-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-2001 2001-06 
Prime minister Chartichai Anand Chuan I Banharn Chaovalit Chuan II Thaksin 
oppositional politics 
model 
Profit-oriented ? Profit-oriented 
Principle 
-oriented 
Profit-oriented 
“lokanuwat” model  
Transforming the national economy  
into one dependent on  
the global economy 
 
 
 
3. Limit of Oppositional Politics Model and Critics against Liberal Corporatism 
The pattern that the profit/principle model, or oppositional politics model proposed is 
seemingly persuasive. Few researchers will deny the arguments about the personal connection and 
business deals between leaders of Thailand and CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Vietnam) 
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through the 1990s, and some of the leaders actually admitted by themselves that the relations 
between Thailand and CLMVs were to be developed for the sake of Thai companies
3
. Nevertheless, 
notably, their discussion still left room for further verification of the backgrounds and motives of the 
policymakers for the reasons shown below. 
First, it explains foreign policy making solely by domestic politics and discusses 
international influence separately.  Although their arguments have their roots in the emergence of a 
“middle class” created by the development of international market-oriented economies, the influence 
of international economic/political relations after that was not taken into account until the outbreak 
of the Asia Economic Crisis in 1997.  
In this regard, the second problem of the oppositional politics model is that much of the 
research mentioned above has largely focused on the foreign policies of the late 1980s or after the 
Asia Financial Crisis in ‘97, and little is known about the foreign policy in the early 1990s.  In 
terms of Indochinese policy, it is well-known that the Greater Mekhong Sub-region (GMS), one of 
the most important initiatives for Indochina regional cooperation was proposed by the Anand 
Panyarachun government (1991-92), one of the typical “reformist” governments, but no speculation 
has taken place on their motives and background so far.  Likewise, regional diplomacy by Chuan 
Leekipai’s first government (1992-95) has seldom been examined while his second government 
(1997-2001) has often been referred to as the prime case of the principle-seeking foreign policy. In 
order to validate the policies by profit-seeking governments, I suggest that it is indispensable to 
analyze foreign policies by governments in the early 90s. 
Third, the notion of “principle” in the arguments of the oppositional model was quite 
narrowly defined. In her arguments about Chuan’s Myanmar policy in the late 90s, Kusuma 
presented the notion as almost equal to democracy and human rights.  The principle or long-term 
strategy need not necessarily be democratic nor humanitarian (although it is ethically desirable to be), 
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and there is undeniably the possibility that profit-seeking governments could have some sort of 
long-term strategy or principle (although they might fail to achieve it). In other words, no 
speculation has taken place concerning the possible long-term strategy of the governments alleged to 
be profit-seekers.  
This question was exposed by the conflicting evaluations of Thaksin’s “proactive foreign 
policy.” In contrast to Thien and other critics to Thaksin, Aoki concluded in a study of Thaksin’s 
“proactive foreign policy” that by that policy Thaksin aimed to upgrade Thailand’s status in the 
global economy (2008).  Likewise, Pavin evaluated Thaksin’s ODA toward neighboring countries 
as one that tried to shift “Thailand’s role from recipient to donor country and to re-map the political 
landscape by locating Thailand at the center of the region” (Pavin 2010, 276). Although Aoki and 
Pavin acknowledged that Thaksin actually gained business deals that were profitable for his private 
company from national foreign policy such as telecom deals with the Myanmar government, they 
stated that it is one aspect of Thaksin’s foreign policy. What their studies conveyed is that the 
analytical problem of the prevailing framework for Thailand’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
age is not enough to understand the contemporary phenomenon.   
Lastly, I would like to emphasize the need to take into account the criticism against liberal 
corporatism and the arguments of the middle class on which the oppositional model relies in the 
arguments of foreign policy. 
Ji and Tamada criticized the arbitrariness of the definition of “middle class.” Although those 
who actually joined the Black May demonstration were the urban white-colors (the new middle) and 
the small- and medium-sized self-employers (the old middle), they pointed out that the owners of big 
business groups have later been included in the middle class (Ji 2000, 77; Tamada 2003, 20). 
Reminding that Anek and Chai-anan already pointed out that those big business groups had 
joined/been incorporated into the bureaucratic polity in the 1980s, it raises the question of why those 
big business owners had changed their preferences from pro-bureaucracy to pro-democracy. The 
13 
 
same question can be asked of technocrats. Technocracy defined in general as “one sub-group of 
bureaucrats that possesses specialized knowledge” (Centeno 1993, 310) is another keyword for Thai 
politics. In the 1980s, they had been placed in key positions of the governments by Prime Minister 
Prem Tinsulanonda and had worked through the structural adjustment of the World Bank loan 
following the economic crisis in 1979 (Anek 1992, 32).  Surin and MacCargo also cite technocrats 
as a part of the conservatives but later categorize them as the reformists
4
.  These arguments provoke 
the question of whether or not those technocrats were the same ones as those who worked for and 
joined in the so-called bureaucratic polity.  Even if they were, it is not yet clear why and how they 
changed their preference to pro-democracy.  
Globalization studies in Thailand represented as “lokanuwat” had already recognized this 
question in the early 1990s. Here we review the gist of their criticism against liberal corporatism (or 
civil society theory) by referring to Masaki Tahakashi’s paper concerning lokanuwat’s discussion 
(2005). According to Takahashi, lokanuwat studies (literally meaning “being subject to the world”) 
stressed socio-economic fairness as a key factor of democracy, not only the election system in itself.  
He referred to the work by Saneh Chamarik, one of the advocates of lokanuwat, and stressed that 
liberal principles (especially one regarding economics) do not necessarily promote democracy 
(Takahashi 2005, 172; Saneh 1999, 159-160). Furthermore, Saneh noted that the governments in 
developing countries regardless of whether they were popularly elected or not, have acted as agents 
of the foreign capitals or governments and transformed their own national economy into one 
dependent on the global economic system (Saneh 1993, 1999; 154-159).  In this system, Saneh 
argued, liberal principles have increased the wealth gap within society.  Accordingly, those who 
were categorized as “reformists” by Anek, Surin and MacCargo are nothing but agents of global 
capital. 
Although the significance of lokanuwat is the mechanism for producing socio-economic 
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 See Surin and MacCargo (1997), pp. 14-146. 
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disparity between those who are connected with global capital and those who are not, the point that 
they regard governments as agents of global economy is seen to be of value to formulate a new 
framework to comprehend Thailand’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.  In concluding 
remarks, I present the implications for future study of Thai foreign policy derived from the 
arguments discussed above. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 In reviewing the research on Thailand’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, this paper 
has identified the limitations of the current research about the analysis of backgrounds and motives 
pf the policymakers, and proposes a more research framework. The review indicates that the 
prevailing model based on domestic opposition politics has failed to explain the current situations in 
domestic and international politics. , and further positive analysis based on a temporally/spatially 
broader framework is required. In this regard, I recognize the lokanuwat framework as the possible 
starting point of our future research.  
Lokanuwat provides a panoramic viewpoint to analyze the interaction between domestic 
processes and international relations. Its thesis that foreign policymakers as agents of global capital 
have tried to transform Thailand into an economy dependent on the global economic system can 
seemingly be an analytical starting point for future study of Thai foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
era.  In fact, it was during the Asian Economic Crisis that the problem of economic reform was 
highlighted in 1997, but as Suehiro, Doner and other political-economists have noted, economic 
reform toward liberalization has been promoted through the 1990s (Suehiro 2000).  Considering 
those studies, it is reasonable to examine its background and motives as a part of foreign policy 
studies in order to overcome the problems that have been left by the oppositional politics model.   
Nevertheless, it would still be unwise to apply the lokanuwat thesis directly as a hypothesis 
for foreign policy study.  The thesis assumes the global economy is quite a static and determined 
15 
 
system and dynamic speculation about its transformation has not taken place so far.  Furthermore, 
lokanuwat sometimes overemphasizes economic factors as a determinant. Therefore, it is important 
to study political initiatives such as Suvannnaphumi and reinterpret their meaning in the new 
framework.  
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